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Although the pandemic is far from over, Greece has been praised so far for its fast
and firm response to the crisis. The country’s efforts to contain the dissemination
of the virus seem to have achieved # flattening of the curve, i.e. the slowing of the
spread so that fewer people need to seek treatment at any given time. Greece owes
much of its – to date – accomplishment to a number of dubious applications of the
rules laid down in the Constitution.
Fast Response and Fast-Track Legislation
Following the confirmation of the first case of the new coronavirus in Greece on
26 February 2020, the Greek government has enacted and gradually intensified
restrictive measures affecting multiple rights and freedoms of everyone under its
jurisdiction. The freedoms of movement, assembly, economic activity, and the
freedom of religion, which includes the freedom of exercise of religion through
worship, have been subjected to the most severe restrictions by the relevant
legislation.
The Greek Constitution does not provide for a state of emergency that allows for
suspension of rights and obligations in a time of crisis, as Constitutions of many
other countries do. The only relevant provision would be article 48, which stipulates
that Parliament can declare a state of siege in cases of war or other imminent
threats against national security and the democratic regime. However, this provision
is narrowly interpreted as exclusively referring to matters of war and could by no
means be activated in the case of an epidemic or pandemic.
The Constitution, however, does provide for emergency legislation. Article 44(1)
stipulates that
‘[u]nder extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need,
the President of the Republic may, upon the proposal of the Cabinet, issue
acts of legislative content. Such acts shall be submitted to Parliament
for ratification, […] within forty days of their issuance or within forty days
from the convocation of a parliamentary session. Should such acts not be
submitted to Parliament within the above time-limits or if they should not
be ratified by Parliament within three months of their submission, they will
henceforth cease to be in force.’
As of 16 April, Greece has issued 5 Acts of Legislative Content (ALC) and 136
Ministerial Decisions concerning the Covid-19 pandemic. Essentially, all the
measures taken by the Greek government to deal with the Covid-19 situation
emanate from ALCs pursuant to article 44(1). This kind of emergency legislation
has been strongly criticised in the past, especially during the Greek sovereign debt
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crisis, as a ‘fast-track’ way to circumvent parliamentary debates. The submission of
the act for ratification by Parliament within 40 days is the safety valve of the system;
nonetheless the heavy reliance of governments on article 44 should be strongly
discouraged.
The Choice of Ministerial Decisions
All the ALCs have now been ratified by the Parliament and as such continue to be
in effect. The ALCs have so far worked as umbrella-acts that delegate powers to
the executive to take measures and to impose restrictions. The measures have so
far been taken through ministerial decisions, which invoke the general provisions
of the ALCs. Ministerial decisions are decisions of the executive. According to the
Constitution, article 43 paragraph 2,
‘delegation for the purpose of issuing regulatory acts by other administrative
organs shall be permitted in cases concerning the regulation of more
specific matters or matters of local interest or of a technical and
detailed nature’.
The practice of the government to impose extensive restrictive measures through
ministerial decisions goes beyond the institutional role of these decrees. Presidential
decrees of article 43 paragraph 1 would be a sounder option. Such Presidential
decrees would further be subject to preliminary (ex ante) review by the Supreme
Administrative Court. Pursuant to article 95(1) (d) of the Constitution, all decrees of a
general regulatory nature are reviewed by the Court before signed by the President
of the Republic. To bypass the Court’s ex ante review of constitutionality is rather
problematic, taking into consideration that these are temporary measures and their
retrospective judicial review would likely be meaningless (although it depends on
how long they last!).
Limiting the Freedom of Movement
A nation-wide lockdown was imposed on 22 March entailing restrictions on all non-
essential movement throughout the country. Limitations of rights and freedoms are
allowed by article 25 of the Constitution, which stipulates however that
‘[r]estrictions of any kind which, according to the Constitution, may be
imposed upon these rights, should be provided either directly by the
Constitution or by Statute, should a reservation exist in the latter’s favour,
and should respect the principle of proportionality’.
The freedom of movement (part of the protection of personal liberty) enshrined in
article 5 paragraph 3 of the Constitution belongs to those freedoms that cannot
be suspended in a state of siege under article 48. Also, the Constitution provides
that individual administrative measures restricting the freedom of movement are
prohibited (article 5 par 4). Nonetheless, an interpretative clause to paragraph 4
clarifies that this prohibition does not preclude the ‘imposition of measures necessary
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for the protection of public health or the health of sick persons, as specified by law’.
The Joint Ministerial Decisions (JMD) that restrict the freedom of movement invoke,
inter alia, this interpretative clause of article 5 as their basis.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the constitutional provisions shows that paragraph
4 refers to individual administrative measures. These measures, according to the
prevailing interpretation, refer to individual limitations on the movement of people
for whom there are indications that they are infected by a contagious disease.
What is more, it is accepted that the legislator must set out the requirements for the
issuance of the administrative acts in a general but definite, clear, and objective
manner. Therefore, it does not seem plausible to argue that the overall restriction of
movement for the entire population throughout the country falls under the rubric of
individual administrative measures. Further, the obligation to make a declaration of
the purpose of movement can hardly be seen as constitutional, as such a limitation
would violate the core of the freedom enshrined in article 5 par 3. Hence, the
government has stretched the reach of article 5 paragraph 4 and its interpretative
clause, turning a blind eye to paragraph 3. 
Necessity and Proportionality
The test of necessity and proportionality as imposed by the Constitution and
international human rights law requires a complex reasoning process but is crucial
for the assessment of the measures. In light of the urgency and unfamiliarity with
the situation, the Greek measures have often been viewed as necessary and
proportionate. This position is reinforced by the fact that the measures are taken
for a definite time (currently extended until 30 April). However, as the situation
evolves, the necessity and proportionality of the restrictions must be put under
stricter scrutiny.
Great controversy has been caused for example due to the limitations on the right
to worship in a country where religion still plays a large role in the society, and
especially during the time of the most popular religious celebration – the Orthodox
Easter. Access to places of worship of any religion or dogma is currently prohibited
and only TV or radio broadcasting of the services is permitted. An argument that can
be advanced here is that measures of social distancing in churches (e.g. queuing
in the church yard as one does outside of super markets) – an option followed by
Bulgaria and Russia – would have been equally adequate and thus, a total lockdown
is unnecessary. Along similar lines, the prohibition of the use of loudspeakers in
churches, common practice in Greece that allows the mass to be heard in the street,
does not seem to serve any purpose in combating the pandemic.
In general, expanding and intensifying the testing of the general population or
imposing tailored limitations of movement only on affected or vulnerable groups
would appear to be more appropriate measures available to the government to deal
with the crisis. Further, strengthening the public health system and putting private
hospitals and clinics to the use of the State would allow further relaxation of the
measures.
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Scrutinizing the Executive
The constant monitoring of current and future measures is of the utmost importance
so as to ensure that they remain as limited as possible in material, temporal, and
geographical terms. Also, questioning the measures should not been seen as
a taboo; rather, this is the only way to subject executive power to control on a
continuous basis. This, in turn, will require the government to be more meticulous
and vigilant in adopting measures in the first place.
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